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Abstract4
Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our com-5
mon beliefs are widespread. For example, if eliminativism is our BPT, then6
our BPT conflicts with common beliefs about the existence of middle-sized7
composite artifacts. “Compatibilism” is the name usually given to a theoret-8
ical attitude, according to which, in the case of a conflict between BPT and9
a common belief P, we should try to find a reconciliation. The two major10
variants of compatibilism are “semantic compatibilism” (SC) and “cognitive11
compatibilism” (CC). According to SC, to be reconciled with BPT is the12
“real” version of the content of our ordinary assertions; according to CC, to13
be reconciled with BPT is the mental state we are “really” in while thinking14
P. In this paper, we present a new kind of compatibilism, epistemic compati-15
bilism (EC). According to EC, to be reconciled with BPT is the explanation16
of why we believe that P. After presenting EC, we will argue that it fares17
better than SC and CC for at least two related reasons: EC does not rely on18
any form of what we call semantic or cognitive “recarving”; thus, EC avoids19
some sceptical problems that a ect the other two versions of compatibilism.20
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1 Introduction23
Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our commonsense24
assertions and beliefs are widespread. For example, eliminativism conflicts with25
our commonsense ontology of composite objects, four-dimensionalism with our26
commonsense three-dimensionalism worldview, nominalism with our capacity to27
quantify and refer to abstract objects, Lewisian modal realism with the idea that28
what is possible for us it is true of us.129
Assume that eliminativism is our BPT and consider the following argument:30
(1) According to eliminativism, there are no chairs.31
(2) It is commonly believed that there are chairs.32
(3) The proposition that there are chairs and the proposition that there are no33
chairs are inconsistent.34
(4) Therefore: eliminativism and the common belief that there are chairs are35
incompatible.36
The general form of this disagreement could be represented by the schema:37
(Dis) 1. According to BPT, Â.38
2. It is commonly believed that „.39
3. pÂq and p„q are inconsistent.40
4. Therefore: BPT and the common belief that „ are incompatible,41
1A terminological note: by “eliminativism”, here and in the rest of the paper, we have in mind
a position in the metaphysics of material objects, according to which there are no middle-sized
composite artifacts, not the position in the philosophy of mind, according to which mental states
posited by common sense do not exist. See van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001).
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where „ and Â are sentences, pÂq and p„q the propositions they express, “according42
to BPT, Â” simply means that Â is a consequence of BPT and „ and Â are43
inconsistent in the case that „ and Â cannot be true together. For the argument44
to go through, it is essential to implicitly assume that a theory and a belief are45
incompatible just in case their propositional content are inconsistent. As we will46
see, this assumption will be shown to be problematic.47
Conflicts between BTPs and beliefs can be managed in at least two ways.48
According to what might be called the “pereat belief strategy”, it is our beliefs49
that must go. After all, our BPTs are there just to clean up our common sense50
and to eradicate false recalcitrant beliefs. According to Quine (1948), for example,51
the fact that certain entities are assumed or dismissed by our BPT (preferably52
expressed in a first-order language) constitutes, basically alone, a good reason to53
abandon beliefs about such entities and a justification to endorse other beliefs54
compatible with the existential commitments of the BPT.55
However, not every recalcitrant common belief counts as equal. Some of them56
regulate fundamental aspects of our worldview, conceptual abilities or inferential57
practices. In such a case, the contrast should be solved more cautiously. One should58
look for a reconciliation strategy, a strategy to reconcile recalcitrant common beliefs59
with BPTs.60
In this paper, we will use the term “compatibilism” to refer to any attempt done61
in philosophy to reconcile such recalcitrant common beliefs with BPTs. There are62
various forms of compatibilism, but most of them belong to the following two kinds:63
Semantic compatibilism BPT and „ are compatible (s-compatible), if it is64
shown that the proposition expressed by an ordinary utterance of “„” is65
consistent with Â.66
Cognitive compatibilism BPT and „ are compatible (c-compatible), if it is67
shown that the mental state a subject x is in when entertaining „ does not68
commit x to some proposition inconsistent with Â.69
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Semantic compatibilism has been and continues to be a classic strategy of rec-70
onciliation in analytic philosophy, and it has been widely applied, especially in71
metaphysics. According to O’Leary Hawthorne and Michaelis (1996, p. 117), for72
example, “compatibilist semantics is very much orthodoxy in the metaphysics of73
the Anglo-American tradition”. Under semantic compatibilism, BPT and a re-74
calcitrant common belief „ are reconciled if it is shown that the former and the75
proposition expressed by an ordinary utterance of “„” can be (and preferably, actu-76
ally are) true together. Assume that someone believes that the average American77
has 2.3 children and that this contrasts with our BPT according to which there are78
no entities such as average men. To reconcile the belief and the BPT, the semantic79
compatibilist holds that the proposition really expressed by an ordinary utterance80
of “the average American has 2.3 children” does not imply the existence of average81
Americans.282
Cognitive compatibilism is a strategy of reconciliation that aims to capture83
some distinctive features of hermeneutic fictionalism.3 The main presupposition84
of cognitive compatibilism is that to reconcile a conflict between common beliefs85
and BPTs, what needs to be shown is that the cognitive attitude we have towards86
a certain content does not entail any incompatible commitment with BPT. For87
example, the belief that Sherlock Holmes is a detective contrasts with our BPT,88
according to which there are no fictional entities. To reconcile the belief with the89
BPT, the cognitive compatibilist holds that the cognitive attitude we really have90
while thinking about Sherlock Holmes is such that it does not commit one to the91
existence of Sherlock Holmes. In particular, the cognitive attitude we really are in92
while thinking about Sherlock Holmes is the non-existentially committing attitude93
of pretense.494
2For example, Quine (1948), Yablo (1998), Kennedy and Stanley (2009).
3The distinction hermeneutic/revolutionary comes from Burgess (1983) and Burgess and
Rosen (1997). Stanley (2001, p. 36) introduced the the term “hermeneutic fictionalism”. See also
Yablo (2001) and Kalderon (2005).
4For J. Stanley:
The hermeneutic fictionalist about a discourse D holds that those who are com-
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Both kinds of compatibilism have something in common. They are both based95
on a methodological attitude that might be called “recarving”: semantic compati-96
bilism is based on a form of semantic recarving, according to which the proposition97
expressed by ordinary assertions is not (at least in some cases) what it appears to98
be. The proposition really expressed by “the average American has 2.3 children” is99
that the number of children divided by the number of Americans is 2.4. Cognitive100
compatibilism is based on a form of cognitive recarving, according to which the101
mental states we are in while entertaining a proposition are not what they appear102
to be. The mental state we are in while thinking about Sherlock Holmes is really103
one of pretense, not belief.104
The aim of this paper is to present and defend a third kind of compatibilism,105
epistemic compatibilism:106
Epistemic compatibilism (EC): BPT and „ are compatible (e-compatible) when107
there is an explanation showing why it is believed that „ is consistent with108
Â.5109
According to epistemic compatibilism, to be compatible with BPTs it is not110
the recarved content of our ordinary assertions or the recarved mental states, but111
the explanation of such beliefs. What is needed to obtain a reconciliation between112
BPTs and recalcitrant common beliefs is that their explanation and BPTs can be113
(or actually are) true together.114
Epistemic compatibilism is not based on any form of recarving: a recalcitrant115
belief that „ is really a belief that „ and not some other non-committing mental116
petent with the vocabulary in D, when employing it, are in fact also involved in a
pretense,
and then he adds:
Pretense is unquestionably a psychological attitude one bears to content; it is
in the same family of attitudes as belief
(Stanley, 2001, p. 4 and p. 13).
5It should be clear that our use of “epistemic compatibilism” has nothing to do with the
position under the same name in the debate surrounding doxastic agency.
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state and an ordinary assertion of “„” expresses just the proposition that „. For117
this reason, an epistemic reconciliation between recalcitrant „ and BPTs leaves the118
contrast between BPT and „ untouched: if BPT is true (and we should assume119
it is), „ is a false belief to have. These error-theoretic consequences of epistemic120
compatibilism are mitigated by the fact that the level of compatibility has now121
been transferred at a di erent level: it is not between the belief that „ and BPT122
directly, but between an explanation of why it is believed that „ and BPT.123
Let us see how the three forms of compatibilism work in a specific case.124
Assume that eliminativism, the view according to which composite middle-sized125
objects do not exist, is our BPT and that the recalcitrant common belief is that126
there are chairs (or any other middle-sized artifact in general).127
According to semantic compatibilism, the belief that there are chairs in the128
living room and eliminativism are compatible in case it is shown that an ordinary129
assertion of “chairs exist” expresses a proposition that is compatible with the non-130
existence of middle-sized artifactual objects or, in weaker versions, that an ordinary131
assertion of “chairs exist” does not clearly express a proposition that is incompatible132
with the non-existence of chairs.133
According to cognitive compatibilism, the belief that there are chairs and elim-134
inativism are compatible in case it is shown that the mental state we are in while135
thinking about the existence of chairs (or artifacts in general) is a mental state136
whose commitments are compatible with the non-existence of chairs.137
According to epistemic compatibilism, the belief that there are chairs and elim-138
inativism are compatible in case it can be shown that the explanation of why it is139
believed that there are chairs is compatible with the non-existence of chairs (and140
of middle-sized artifacts in general).141
Our aim in this paper is to show that epistemic compatibilism is the best142
strategy of reconciliation. Two cautionary observations are in order before we143
start: (i) here we are more interested in describing the structural features of an144
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epistemic reconciliation than in spelling out explicitly the details of an epistemic145
compatibilist project, and (ii) we are not committed to the view that there is146
an epistemic reconciliation in any case of conflict between a BPT and a common147
belief. There may be cases where common beliefs and BPTs are incompatible148
because there is no way to explain why we believe certain propositions in a way149
which is compatible with our BPTs. Our point is that, in all those cases where the150
reconciliation could be e ectively carried out, the epistemic version is preferable151
to its semantic or cognitive one.152
We will proceed in the following way. In Sections 2 and 3, we will discuss,153
respectively, semantic and cognitive compatibilisms and their problems, in Section154
4, we are going to present epistemic compatibilism. In the last two sections of the155
paper, we will discuss the way in which epistemic compatibilism avoids scepticism156
and the di erence between epistemic compatibilism and debunking arguments.157
2 On semantic compatibilism and its problems158
Consider an ordinary assertion of the following sentence:159
(1) There are chairs in the next room.160
For semantic compatibilists, to interpret the ordinary assertion in 1 as straight-161
forwardly implying the existence of chairs would be hasty. We are often misled by162
the superficial form of ordinary speech and 1 may be just a case of this.163
There are various ways in which this strategy could be developed.6 According164
to what is sometimes called “the traditional method of reconciling paraphrases”,165
to avoid the commitment to chairs, the semantic compatibilist must show that 1166
could be paraphrased by another sentence expressing a proposition that does not167
commit one to the existence of chairs. For example, 1 could be paraphrased along168
the lines of:169
6For a description of various semantic compatibilist strategies, see, for example, Korman (2016,
Ch. 5).
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(2) There are some particles arranged chair-wise in the next room.170
Thus 2 expresses a proposition perfectly compatible with eliminativism because171
it commits one just to non-composite entities arranged in a certain way.172
The stronger version of the method of reconciling paraphrases has it that 2173
gives us an analysis of 1.174
However, there are weaker alternatives: for example, one may claim that while 1175
and 2 do not have the same content (one is false, the other is true), 2 is nonetheless176
a good paraphrase of 1 because 2 can be used “for the same job”. An even weaker177
alternative is one according to which we are not in a position to exclude that the178
proposition expressed by 1 is the one expressed by 2.179
Semantic compatibilists may appeal to a number of contextual phenomena to180
defend the view. For example, they may claim that, as uttered in ordinary contexts,181
the quantifiers in 1 should not be interpreted as joint-carving or fundamental, and182
so, in such contexts, 1 is not really in contrast with eliminativism. Eliminativism183
and its consequences should be stated instead using joint-carving or fundamental184
quantifiers.185
Others eliminativists may suggest that an ordinary assertion of 1 is simply a186
case of loose talk: what speakers really mean by uttering 1 is really something187
along the lines of 2. We use 1 as a lazy, idiomatic way of speaking.7188
A more sophisticated version of semantic compatibilism is the one defended by189
P. van Inwagen in Material Beings (1990) and other writings.8 Here is what he190
7See Thomasson (2007) for loose talk; Lewis (1986, p. 213), Lewis (1991, par. 3.5), Sosa
(1999, p. 142), Sider (2004, p. 680) and Richard (2006) for quantifier domain restriction; Dorr
(2005, Sec. 7), Chalmers (2009), Cameron (2008, pp. 300-301) and Cameron (2010, p. 256)
on the distinction between “joint-carving” and “non-joint-carving” quantifiers; and Horgan and
Potr  (2008) for a “contextually operative” semantic notion of truth (see Korman 2008 for a
discussion). See also Eklund (2005) for the “indi erentist” strategy, according to which ordinary
speakers really do not care about the real content of a sentence like 1.
8See also van Inwagen (2014) for a further elaboration. We are here assuming, as does,
for example, Merricks (2001), that, in the case of van Inwagen, the thesis that there are no
composite artifactual objects, usually called “nihilism”, entails the view that there are no ordinary
things such as chairs, tables or any macro-physical objects, usually called “eliminativism” (about
ordinary, material objects). We are thus attributing to van Inwagen a form of “eliminative
nihilism”. According to G. Contessa (2014), one could endorse the first thesis without endorsing
the second, and he calls this view “non-eliminative nihilism”.
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wrote in 2014:191
In Material Beings I endorsed a meta-ontological position that implies192
that the sentence “chairs exist” expressed a di erent proposition in the193
context I am now calling “the ontology room” from the one it expresses194
in the context I called “the ordinary business of life”.195
According to van Inwagen, a sentence like 1, in the context of the “ontology196
room”, is interpreted according to the standards of a “Tarskian language”; thus,197
it requires for its truth the satisfaction of the propositional function “x is a chair”.198
If eliminativism is our BPT, no single entity could satisfy such a propositional199
function; thus, 1 expresses a false proposition. However, in ordinary contexts, sen-200
tences are not interpreted using a Tarskian language; according to van Inwagen,201
ordinary speakers “are not only not speaking Tarskian, but are not committed to202
the ‘obvious’ translation of their sentences into Tarskian”.9 Thus, the truth of an203
ordinary use of 1 does not require the satisfaction of the propositional function “x204
is a chair” and, thus, does not commit us (or, better, it does not commit us for205
this reason) to the existence of chairs. Actually, nobody knows (or nobody seems206
to care) what proposition 1 expresses in an ordinary context; what we know, van207
Inwagen claims, is that in such contexts, 1 expresses a proposition which is neces-208
sarily equivalent (“true in exactly the same possible worlds”) to a metaphysically209
neutral proposition. The metaphysically neutral proposition to which 1 is neces-210
sarily equivalent to is something along the lines of 2, which is perfectly compatible211
with eliminativism. Unlike other forms of semantic compatibilism, according to212
van Inwagen, the compatible proposition, 2, does not give us the “real content” of213
1; 1 and 2 simply express two distinct but necessarily equivalent propositions.214
But why be a semantic compatibilist? In particular, why it is so important215
to “save” recalcitrant commonsense beliefs? This quotation by van Inwagen is216
especially revealing:217
9van Inwagen (2014, p. 7).
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Any philosopher who denies what practically everyone believes is, so218
far as I can see, adopting a position according to which the human219
capacity for knowing the truth of things is radically defective. And220
why should he think that his own capacities are the exception to this221
rule? (van Inwagen, 1990, p. 103)222
Here, it is clear that van Inwagen’s endorsement of semantic compatibilism223
is, ultimately, a reaction to the threat of a global form of scepticism: if believed224
propositions expressed by our ordinary utterances about artifacts come out false,225
then we cannot exclude that the entire system of “common beliefs formation” is226
wrong. To avoid global scepticism, the eliminativist needs to “save the phenomena”227
in a semantic way: ordinary utterances need to come out as true, not simply228
“acceptable”, “useful”, “almost true”, etc.229
We are going to highlight two problems for semantic compatibilism and scep-230
ticism:231
1. Local scepticism about a certain area of discourse does not necessarily imply a232
global form of scepticism. The adoption of a semantic form of compatibilism233
could thus be seen as an overreaction.234
2. Semantic compatibilism is itself a potential source of scepticism.235
Let us look at the first problem.236
A non-compatibilist eliminativist holds that our common beliefs about arti-237
facts are false. If they are false, they cannot be justified or known, so the non-238
compatibilist eliminativist defends a form of local scepticism about artifacts talk.239
As we have seen, for van Inwagen, a local form of scepticism about artifacts would240
drive us towards a global form of scepticism. If our assertions and beliefs about ar-241
tifacts cannot be known or justified, we should much doubt everything else. What242
is worse is that global scepticism will also involve the justificational status of our243
BPTs. If we cannot know “the truth of things”, how can we justify the view that,244
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for example, eliminativism is our BPT? There has to be a balance between hav-245
ing a revisionist metaphysics like eliminativism and saving (semantically) common246
sense: common sense needs to be “saved” as soon as we want to save our revisionist247
metaphysics from the threat of global scepticism.248
Within this line of reasoning, van Inwagen (1990) seems to assume that once249
we conclude a local form of scepticism, this is enough to conclude a global form of250
it. If we are wrong about artifacts, we might be wrong in all other areas. Local251
scepticism about artifacts immediately weakens our justifications for all other areas,252
and thus, global scepticism follows. This line of argument is based on a hidden253
assumption, and we believe that this assumption is wrong. The assumption is254
that the reasons that support a local form of scepticism about an area of discourse255
are transferable to all other areas. However, local scepticisms could have di erent256
origins and/or could be the result of di erent trains of thought; thus, they cannot257
be “aggregated” to conclude a global form of scepticism.258
Scepticism about artifacts talk is motivated by ontological qualms, in particu-259
lar, qualms about the relation of composition. However, there are other forms of260
local scepticism that are not based on ontological considerations or are not based on261
ontological considerations of the same kind. For example, scepticism about math-262
ematical discourse is based on ontological considerations concerning the existence263
of abstract objects. However, the reasons for being sceptical about the existence of264
abstract objects have nothing to do with the reasons for being sceptical about the265
relation of composition for material objects. Therefore, reasons that support lo-266
cal scepticism about artifacts do not support local scepticism about mathematical267
discourse.268
Another similar case is that of morality. Moral scepticism (the view that we269
cannot know moral truths) is often based on ontological considerations. For exam-270
ple, for J. L. Mackie (1977) there are no moral truths because there are no moral271
properties, and moral properties do not exist because their postulation would re-272
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quire the postulation of “queer” entities such as objective prescriptions. But also273
in this case, scepticism about queer moral entities seems to be disconnected from274
scepticism about the relation of composition. Therefore, reasons that support local275
scepticism about artifacts do not transfer to scepticism about moral discourse.276
Finally, there are forms of local scepticism not based on ontological considera-277
tions. Take scepticism about meaning, the view that there is no privileged relation-278
ship between an expression and what we might be tempted to call its “meaning”.279
According to Kripke (1982), for example, is not a matter of fact whether by “+”280
we mean the function addition or the function quaddition. This kind of scepticism281
does not seem to be based on ontological considerations or, at least, on any onto-282
logical qualms about the relation of composition. Thus, scepticism about meaning283
cannot be derived from a local scepticism about artifacts.284
A non-compatibilist eliminativist could then associate her local scepticism about285
artifact talk to a non-sceptical position about mathematical or moral discourse or286
to a non-sceptical attitude about meaning. Van Inwagen is, therefore, wrong when287
he claims that a local form of scepticism about middle-sized material objects would288
imply a global form of scepticism. There seems to be no natural route from local289
scepticism about middle-sized material objects to global ignorance. Hence, there290
is no urgency to associate a compatibilist meta-ontological position to a revisionist291
metaphysics.292
Let us now look at the second problem, namely that semantic compatibilism is293
itself a potential source of scepticism.294
Let us start by asking: what does it mean to have an anti-sceptical attitude295
about artifact talk? Well, a plausible hypothesis is that being anti-sceptical about296
ordinary existential beliefs about composite objects presupposes a transparent ac-297
cess to the content of such beliefs. This seems to be true in general. For example,298
to have an anti-sceptical attitude about mathematics presupposes that the content299
of mathematical propositions is transparent to us. The assertion “2 ◊ 3 = 6” (or300
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the belief that 2 ◊ 3 = 6) is transparent to us if we have access to the proposi-301
tion it expresses and to its constituents (assuming that propositions are structured302
entities). If we did not know what proposition is expressed by mathematical asser-303
tions we would not say that we know mathematical truths. Transparency is thus304
a necessary condition to have an anti-sceptical attitude towards a certain area of305
discourse.306
We believe that semantic compatibilism implies a non-transparent access to the307
content of our beliefs.308
Consider a form of semantic compatibilism based on the method of reconciling309
paraphrases. What the compatibilist typically holds in such cases is that common310
sense and BPT can be reconciled, if it is possible to show that, for an ordinary311
assertion expressing a recalcitrant common sense belief, a paraphrase expressing a312
proposition that is compatible with BPT exists.313
However, the mere existence of a paraphrase is not enough. In order to show314
that common sense is compatible with BPT, the semantic compatibilist should315
also show that the proposition that the speaker has in mind when uttering the316
problematic sentence is the one expressed by the paraphrase, not the one prima317
facie expressed by the paraphrasandum.318
In general terms, given an ordinary assertion S1 that prima facie expresses319
a proposition in contrast with BPT, the semantic compatibilist has to show two320
theses, one semantic, the other “psycho-semantic”:321
1. A paraphrase of S1, S2, which expresses a proposition compatible with BPT,322
exists.323
2. Speakers who use S1 really wish to express what S2 expresses.324
The problem is that a semantic compatibilist is rarely in a position to o er any325
evidence in favour of the psycho-semantic thesis. Take the case of eliminativism:326
no ordinary speaker would admit that her ordinary utterances about chairs really327
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express propositions about particles disposed chair-wise. In the absence of an328
appropriate justification for the psycho-semantic thesis, semantic compatibilism329
entails “semantic blindness”, according to which ordinary speakers are not aware330
of the proposition expressed by their ordinary utterances. They believe in making331
an assertion about artifacts, but unbeknownst to them, they are really asserting332
something about X-wise disposed particles. Semantic blindness is a form of non-333
transparency, so semantic compatibilism implies a non-transparent access to the334
content of our beliefs and assertions.335
The same kind of problem a ects more sophisticated versions of semantic com-336
patibilism such as van Inwagen’s; as we have seen, van Inwagen (2014, p. 7) does337
not believe that the proposition that an ordinary speaker is willing to express is the338
metaphysically neutral proposition. His position is that the proposition expressed339
in an ordinary context is di erent from the metaphysically neutral proposition,340
even though it is necessarily equivalent to it. The problem, however, is that the341
ordinary speaker is not aware that the same utterance can express two di erent342
propositions in di erent contexts. She is not aware that “chairs exist” should343
receive a Tarskian interpretation in theoretical contexts and a di erent interpreta-344
tion in ordinary contexts. Actually, no ordinary speaker really seems to care about345
it. We are thus in a situation where an ordinary speaker utters 1 in an ordinary346
context without exactly knowing what proposition is really expressed. Even this347
kind of semantic unawareness is a form of semantic blindness that brings with it348
non-transparency and, in the end, scepticism.349
3 On cognitive compatibilism and its problems350
A cognitive compatibilist is one who claims that the apparent ontological commit-351
ments of a certain area of discourse should not be taken literally, because when we352
are engaged in such a discourse, we are engaged in a pretense.353
For the cognitive compatibilist, when we say something like “there are prime354
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numbers”, we are not literally believing that there are prime numbers (even though355
the content we are entertaining is that there are prime numbers), but we are in a356
peculiar mental state C such that C(pthere are prime numbersq) does not commit357
us to the the existence of prime numbers. Being in such a mental state, the358
cognitive compatibilist argues, is the same epistemic state we are in when we are359
playing games of make-believe or grasping figurative language.10 On this basis, the360
cognitive compatibilist could claim, for example, that our common beliefs about361
numbers and our best nominalistic theories could be reconciled because when we362
think that there are numbers, we are not really expressing our belief in the existence363
of numbers, but our make-belief in the existence of numbers, and our make-belief364
that there are numbers does not commit us to the existence of numbers.365
In the same manner, eliminativism could be cognitively reconciled with the366
common belief that there are chairs, if it can be shown that we are not really367
believing that there are chairs, but only make-believing that there are chairs, that368
our chair talking, and, in general, our artifact talking, is fictional, i.e. we are369
engaged in a pretense.370
As the semantic compatibilist aims to show that an ordinary utterance of “„”371
really expresses a proposition that is compatible with BPT, the cognitive compat-372
ibilist aims to show that the mental state Bel(p„q) really is a mental state whose373
commitments are compatible with BPT. For the eliminativist who is also a seman-374
tic compatibilist, we are not really expressing the proposition that there are chairs375
while uttering, in an ordinary context, “there are chairs”; for the eliminativist who376
is also a cognitive compatibilist, the mental state we are in while uttering “there377
are chairs” in an ordinary context is not a belief.378
We are now going to highlight two problems for cognitive compatibilism.379
The first is that, in order to be a cognitive compatibilist about a certain area380
of discourse, it has to be shown that we are in a peculiar mental state when we381
10Cfr. Walton (1990).
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are engaged in a discourse belonging to such an area or that such an area exhibits382
some similarities with figurative speech. This might be easy for fictional discourse,383
more di cult for mathematical discourse and very di cult in the case of artifact384
talk.385
An eliminativist who is also a cognitive compatibilist should show that when386
we are speaking about chairs we are, unbeknownst to us, in a very peculiar mental387
state, the one we are in when we are engaged in a pretense. Admittedly, this is388
problematic and particularly implausible for the case of artifact talk. What would389
be the evidence? There seems to be no “feeling of non-literality” associated with390
artifact talk and no clear metaphorical element associated with it.391
According to Yablo (2000), there are some “phenomenological features” asso-392
ciated with a discourse that exhibits fictional features. These phenomenological393
features should be recognised by ordinary speakers in ordinary uses. For exam-394
ple, a certain form of indeterminacy is associated with a discourse of such a kind:395
within a pretense, it makes partly no sense to ask for determinate identity relations396
because it is left partly undecided what is to count as identical to what. However,397
no ordinary speaker would consider meaningless the question of whether the chair I398
was speaking about yesterday is the same one that I am speaking about today. At399
least not in the same way as she would consider meaningless the question whether400
the fuse I blew last week is the same one I blew today. The same seems to hold for401
other phenomenological features that Yablo individuates, for example, impatience.402
Within a pretense, we are impatient with literalists who want us to worry that a403
fictional character does not exist (“Sherlock Holmes is a detective, but of course404
Sherlock Holmes does not exist”). The same does not happen within discourse405
about artifacts: the reaction we would have is not impatience (or at least not the406
same kind of impatience) in case someone utters something like “The are two chairs407
in the other room, but, of course, chairs do not exist”. Silliness is another feature408
of fictional discourse that artifact talk seems to lack. According to Yablo (2000,409
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p. 259), fictional discourse invites “silly” questions about their objects: “We know410
how big the average star is. Where is it located?”. The same phenomenon seems411
to be absent in ordinary discourses about artifacts: a question like “We know how412
big the chair in the other room is. Where it is located?” does not sound silly at413
all.11414
While failure of artifact talk to satisfy some or all items in Yablo’s list should415
not be taken as decisive, it is at least revelatory that the cognitive compatibilist416
should o er us more than a hint to prove that the cognitive attitude we have while417
engaged in artifact talk is pretense.418
The second problem is related to scepticism. As we have seen in the previ-419
ous section, semantic compatibilism, while designed to be a response to sceptical420
worries, is itself a source of a sceptical attitude. The reason is that semantic421
compatibilism is based on a non-transparent access to the content of our beliefs.422
Cognitive compatibilism scores no better in this respect because it is based on a423
non-transparent access not to the content but to the identity of our mental states.424
For the cognitive compatibilist, a reconciliation between BPT and a recalcitrant425
belief of an agent could be obtained only upon the condition of showing that the426
mental state the agent is in is not really belief. However, competent speakers427
quite certainly would deny that they are engaged in a pretense while thinking or428
speaking about artifacts. Cognitive compatibilists would then be forced to assume429
that ordinary speakers are pretending without knowing it; they confuse make-430
belief with plain belief. As Stanley (2001, p. 126) emphasises, this implies a “quite431
drastic form of failure of first-person authority over one’s own mental states”.432
While semantic compatibilism entails a loss of first-person authority about the433
content of one’s psychological attitude, cognitive compatibilism entails a loss of434
first-person authority about the identity of one’s own psychological attitude. This435
is a form of “cognitive blindness” that, exactly like semantic blindness in the case436
11The same seems to be true for all features that Yablo individuates (expressiveness, discon-
nectedness, availability, etc.).
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of semantic compatibilism, entails a sceptical attitude.437
Therefore, exactly like semantic compatibilism, cognitive compatibilism is a438
self-defeating strategy of reconciliation between BPTs and recalcitrant common439
beliefs and assertions.440
4 Epistemic compatibilism441
For epistemic compatibilism, the view we are presenting and defending in this442
paper, there is no need to semantically recarve the proposition expressed by an443
ordinary assertion of “„” or to cognitively recarve the mental attitude we have444
towards the proposition expressed by “„”. To obtain a good reconciliation between445
„ and BPT, it is enough that the explanation to believe that „ does not conflict446
with BPT.447
Using p„úq as the proposition, which for an s-compatibilist is “really” expressed448
by an ordinary utterance of “„”, using Belú(p„q) as the mental state, which for a449
c-compatibilist a subject is really in when (having the impression of) believing that450
„, and using Exp(Bel(p„q)) as an explanation of why it is commonly believed that451
„, we could represent the di erent kinds of compatibilism by the following table:452
453
s-compatibilism: BPT is s-compatible with p„úq
c-compatibilism: BPT is c-compatible with Belú(p„q)
e-compatibilism: BPT is e-compatible with Exp(Bel(p„q))
454
As the table clarifies, epistemic compatibilism is the only strategy of reconcili-455
ation not based on any form of recarving, neither semantic (the proposition is the456
one prima facie expressed by an ordinary utterance of “„”) nor cognitive (the men-457
tal state to be explained is just belief). Notice that it follows from the definition458
of epistemic compatibilism, given on page 5, that the e-compatibility of BPT and459
Exp(Bel(p„q)) simply amounts to the requirement that BPT and Exp(Bel(p„q))460
are true together.461
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Now, let us recall the schematic argument by which BPT and „ are declared462
incompatible:463
(Dis) 1. According to BPT, Â464
2. It is commonly believed that „465
3. pÂq and p„q are inconsistent466
4. Therefore: BPT and the common belief that „ are incompatible467
The aim of any compatibilism (be it semantical, cognitive or epistemic) is to468
show that the conclusion does not follow.469
For epistemic compatibilism, the argument does not follow because it relies on a470
wrong conception of incompatibility between BPT and a belief: from the fact that471
BPT and our beliefs have inconsistent propositional content, it does not follow that472
they are incompatible. A theory and a belief can have inconsistent propositional473
content and be compatible nonetheless.474
To show that a theory and a belief are incompatible, we need to show that the475
explanation of why we have such a belief cannot be true together with BPT. If we476
have such an explanation, BPT and the belief are compatible.477
To have a sense of how epistemic compatibilism might work, consider this ex-478
ample (adapted from a famous example of van Inwagen and used for our purposes):479
Copernican cosmological theories conflict with the common belief that the Sun is480
moving across the sky. But, as it happens, we have a very good explanation for481
the tendency to form this belief in creatures like us. The belief originates from our482
impression of seeing the Sun moving, and this impression depends on our position483
(we live on the Earth) and on the e ects on our cognitive systems of the Earth484
rotating around its axis and orbiting around the Sun.485
Once we have this explanation at hand, the belief that the Sun is moving seems486
to be reconciled with our Copernican cosmological theory. This is because not only487
are we able to explain that the propositional content of the belief is false, but more488
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importantly for the reconciliation we have an explanation of why we tend to form489
such a belief, couched in a theory that does not presuppose that the Sun is moving.490
An astronomer trying to explain why we tend to form the belief that the Sun is491
moving would consider it very strange (or she might say, very “philosophical”)492
to say that when we believe that the Sun is moving, we are not really believing493
that the Sun is moving, but we are really having a belief about the axis of the494
Earth. Or, even more strangely, that we are not really believing that the Sun is495
moving across the sky, but only make-believe it. Having produced an explanation496
of the tendency to form such a belief, the astronomer makes the belief somewhat497
“reasonable” in the sense of being explainable in a way compatible with our best498
theory, even though it is false. A belief that is reasonable in this sense, with respect499
to a theory T , is reconciled with T .12500
Our position is that reconciliations between theories and common recalcitrant501
beliefs should be construed along this model, which is not the model of s-compatibilism502
or c-compatibilism, and it is the model often used in scientific contexts when a503
common belief conflicts with our best theories of the physical world.504
Let us see how epistemic compatibilism works in the case of eliminativism.505
Eliminativism and common beliefs about the middle-sized artifacts are reconciled506
(if they can be reconciled at all) in case it is shown that the explanation of why507
it is commonly believed that, for example, there are chairs is compatible with508
eliminativism. In the best case scenario, what would have to be shown is that the509
explanation of the common belief does not actually contradict eliminativism.510
Eliminativism and Expl(Bel(pthere are chairsq) are thus reconciled, if it is511
shown that Expl(Bel(pthere are chairsq) does not imply the existence of chairs512
12One may be worried that even the tendency to believe that the Earth is flat comes out as
“reasonable” in the sense defined above. No panic! This should not be taken as evidence in favour
of such a crazy view. On the contrary, it would simply mean that we could perfectly explain
the false belief that the Earth is flat in terms of the best physical theory, according to which
the Earth is not flat. In e ect, a good line of response to “flatearthists” would just be to point
out that all the phenomenological evidence in favour of their view may receive a perfectly good
explanation in orthodox science that plainly contradicts it. If the belief that the Earth is flat is
epistemically reconciled with our best physical theories, then “flatearthism” is false.
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and middle-sized artifacts, in general, or say the same thing with other words,513
if it is shown that the existence of chairs is dispensable from the explanation of514
the common tendency to believe in chairs. We can thus reformulate epistemic515
compatibilism in such terms:516
Epistemic compatibilism: BPT and „ are reconciled if it is shown that the517
truth of „ is dispensable from Exp(Bel(p„q)).518
Assume that we have at our disposal an explanation of why it is believed that519
there are chairs from which the existence of chairs is not dispensable. Assume,520
for example, that the psychological explanation of our tendency to perceive (and,521
consequently, to believe in the existence of) middle-sized objects such as chairs is522
expressed within a theory, committing us to the existence of chairs or composite523
objects in general. This would be a situation where our BPT, i.e., eliminativism,524
and our psychological theory are in contrast. One way to describe this conflict525
is to say that the ontological commitments of our psychological theory are not526
compatible with those of our BPT.527
What should be done in this kind of cases? Well, it depends on the overall528
meta-theoretical situation. If we have meta-theoretical reasons – having to do529
with simplicity, predictivity, systematicity, etc. – to believe that our psychological530
theory is more “robust” than our BPT, then we should abandon our BPT, i.e.531
eliminativism. This would be simply a case where the reconciliation between BPT532
and our beliefs cannot be done.533
But if we have meta-theoretical reasons to stick to our BPT, one way to solve534
the issue would be to try to reformulate our psychological theory in a way that535
makes it compatible with our BPT. Epistemic reconciliation can thus be seen as536
the reconciliation between two theories: our BPT and the theory in terms of which537
we explain our recalcitrant beliefs.13538
13Even in the case of s-compatibilism, the contrast between „ and BPT could as well be
understood as a contrast between two theories, namely our BPT and our semantic theory for „.
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Notice two things, however. The first: the case in which we try to reformulate539
the theory that explains our beliefs in a way compatible with our BPT should540
not be seen as the manifestation of a general requirement that scientific or non-541
philosophical theories should be made compatible with philosophical ones (it may542
happen sometimes, but it should not be a forced choice). In our case, we are simply543
trying to reformulate a theory in a way that makes its ontological commitments544
compatible with our BPT. To use an analogy: a nominalistic reconstruction of545
mathematics (where nominalism is our BPT) is not a way in which nominalism546
“influence” mathematics, but a way in which the ontological commitments of math-547
ematics are made compatible with nominalism. It is a form of “rewriting” rather548
than a form of “influencing”.14 Second, the eventual requirement to reformulate549
a psychological theory (or whatever theory we need to use to explain a recalci-550
trant belief) in order for it to be compatible with BPT should not be counted as551
a form of “recarving”, at least not in the way in which we have defined it above:552
semantic and cognitive recarving are “operations” done on the recalcitrant belief553
„. Semantic recarving recarves the content of „ while cognitive recarving recarves554
the cognitive status of the belief that „. The eventual reformulation of a theory in555
order for it to be compatible with our BPT is instead just a manifestation of the556
common theoretic attitude of making a theory compatible with what we believe is557
our best theory, something that should be done in any case. The content of „ or558
its cognitive status are left untouched. For epistemic compatibilism, the common559
belief that there are chairs is just the (false) belief that there are chairs. It is rec-560
onciled with eliminativism in case it is shown, for example, that the tendency to561
believe in the existence of composite objects is just some sort of psychological bias.562
The contrast is solved exactly as it would happen in the case of e-compatibilism if it is shown
that our semantic theory is made compatible with our BPT, and if it could generate semantic
analyses of „ that are compatible with BPT. If you are an eliminativist, then it is better if your
semantic theory is compatible with eliminativism.
14We would like to thank a referee of Inquiry to press us on this point. For a discussion of
nominalistic reconstructions, see Chihara (2005). For a critique of this kind of (revolutionary)
forms of nominalism, see Burgess and Rosen (1997).
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However, a psychological theory for which the tendency to believe in composite563
objects is a bias will presumably not have composite objects in its ontology, so it564
will be compatible with eliminativism.15565
One might wonder whether an epistemic reconciliation is too weak. After all, a566
semantic reconciliation seems to be more “robust” than an epistemic reconciliation.567
At the end of the process of semantic reconciliation, the proposition expressed by568
“„” is true together with BPT and what “„” expresses is no more recalcitrant.569
Instead, at the end of the process of epistemic reconciliation, what “„” expresses570
remains recalcitrant and what we have in our hands is “simply” an explanation571
of why it is believed that „, which is compatible with BPT. Is this enough to572
conclude that BPT and the recalcitrant belief are thus reconciled? Surely not, if573
reconciliation requires consistency of propositional content. But, and this is the574
point, not all reconciliations need to be semantical in this sense.575
To evaluate which type of reconciliation is more adequate, we should ask our-576
selves the following question: why are we looking for a reconciliation between BPT577
and our recalcitrant common beliefs in the first place? As mentioned in the intro-578
duction, one reason to look for a reconciliation between BPT and „, actually the579
main one, is to preserve the role of „ as a common belief. So, let us check how the580
“commonality” of „ is preserved under the two kinds of compatibilism.581
Which account better explains the role of „ as a common belief?582
We think that the “doxastic reconstruction” o ered by epistemic compatibilism,583
appearances notwithstanding, is better placed than the semantic reconstruction584
o ered by semantic compatibilism to account for „’s role as a common belief.585
Under semantic compatibilism, the existence of a paraphrase of “„” that makes586
it compatible with BPT does nothing to explain the role of „ as a common belief.587
The reasoning seems to be: given that the belief that „ is common, it needs to588
be “saved” by associating an ordinary utterance of “„” with a paraphrase that589
15We would like to thank a referee of Inquiry for pointing us to this potential ambiguity between
recarving a belief and reformulating the theory that explains a belief.
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expresses a proposition compatible with BPT. However, this reasoning simply as-590
sumes that the belief that „ is common does not explain it.591
Epistemic compatibilism, in contrast, is able to preserve and justify the “com-592
monality” of „. An explanation of the tendency to believe „ just is an explanation593
of why „ is common: reconstructing the doxastic genealogy of „ is also to explain594
the particular role that „ has in our system of beliefs.595
Epistemic compatibilism, unlike semantic compatibilism, is thus able to o er596
an explanation of „’s role as a common belief. Epistemic reconciliation, far from597
being a weak reconciliation, is better placed than semantic reconciliation to explain598
the commonality of „ and thus to reconcile „ with BPT.599
In the next two subsections, we will specify further the main features of epis-600
temic compatibilism by discussing: (i) the way in which it avoids scepticism, and601
finally, (ii) the di erences between an epistemic reconciliation and a debunking602
argument.603
4.1 Epistemic compatibilism and scepticism604
One may wonder whether epistemic compatibilism fares better than semantic and605
cognitive compatibilism with respect to scepticism. After all, if there is an epistemic606
reconciliation between „ and BPT, we are in a situation where Exp(Bel(p„q)) and607
BPT are true together and „ is false; namely, a situation where we have epistemic608
reconciliation and a falsity of recalcitrant common beliefs. However, if common609
beliefs come out false, then, to use van Inwagen’s words again, “[the] capacity to610
know the truth of things is radically defective”.16 So, generalised scepticism seems611
to represent a threat also for epistemic compatibilism.612
Against this sceptical challenge, we can respond in two ways.613
On the one hand, as we have already shown, local error theory about a certain614
area of discourse does not imply any form of generalised scepticism. So, we may615
16van Inwagen (1990, p. 103).
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conclude that all common beliefs for a certain area of discourse are false without616
this implying that the capacity to know the truth of things is “radically defective”;617
it is defective only with respect to that area. Surely, an epistemic reconciliation of618
our common beliefs about chairs with eliminativism implies that common beliefs619
about chairs are false, but this does not imply that all other common beliefs (or620
simply all other existential common beliefs) are false. As we have seen, this is621
compatible with our capacity to know moral, mathematical or semantical truths.622
On the other hand, an epistemic reconciliation does not leave us with only an623
explanation of the falsity of some common beliefs: what an epistemic reconcilia-624
tion o ers us is an explanation of why there is a tendency to have such beliefs.625
The falsity of the common beliefs belonging to this area is thus coupled with an626
explanation of why there is the tendency to have such beliefs, and this prevents627
the local scepticism with respect to an area to expand into other areas or to be628
philosophically “out of control”.629
As we have seen, one of the problems of semantic compatibilism is the lack630
of any plausible justification of the relationship between the proposition that “„”631
expresses prima facie in ordinary contexts and its recarved version. The same holds632
for cognitive compatibilism: it is sometimes very di cult to justify the view that633
the mental states the agents are supposed to be in while thinking the recalcitrant634
content are those postulated by cognitive compatibilists. In the case of artifacts, as635
we have seen, we simply do not have any evidence that we are engaged in a fictional636
discourse when talking and thinking about artifacts. The relationship between „637
or the belief that „ and their recarved versions are thus at risk of being arbitrary638
under both semantic and cognitive compatibilism.639
Epistemic compatibilism does not have this problem: we have epistemic rec-640
onciliation if and only if we have an explanation of the tendency to believe that641
„. The explanations that epistemic compatibilism o ers us are thus both non-642
arbitrary and true. Non-arbitrary because they are explanations just of those643
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recalcitrant beliefs and true because an explanation of a recalcitrant belief that „644
has the same truth value of our BPT.645
The epistemic situation where an epistemic reconciliation leaves us is thus not at646
risk of being sceptical: we are not in a situation where we do not know whether some647
common beliefs are true or false or where we do not know what their content is or648
what the real nature is of the mental state we are in while thinking them. Rather,649
we are in a situation where we know that they are false, and more importantly650
where we have an explanation of their falsity that is compatible with our BPT.651
4.2 Epistemic compatibilism and debunking652
One might wonder whether epistemic compatibilism has something in common653
with debunking arguments.17654
In the moral case, a debunking argument proceeds as follows: from the assump-655
tion that our moral beliefs or dispositions are shaped by natural selection and given656
that natural selection shaped our moral beliefs to favour biological fitness rather657
than to track moral truths, the debunker concludes that there is not an explana-658
tory connection between moral beliefs and a supposed moral reality; thus, that we659
should abandon moral beliefs.660
Essential elements of a debunking argument are:661
• a (usually empirical) claim about the origin of certain beliefs;662
• a claim about the absence of an explanatory connection between such beliefs663
and the facts these beliefs are about.664
Based on such elements, a debunking argument about our beliefs in the exis-665
tence of chairs would be something along the following lines:666
17Cf. Korman (2016, Ch. 7), Benovsky (2015), Merricks (2001), and White (2010); for de-
bunking arguments in the context of discussions about moral realism, see Bedke (2009), Joyce
(2007), Kitcher (2007), Shafer-Landau (2012), and Vavova (2015).
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• the origin of common beliefs about chairs does not depend on the existence667
of chairs (common beliefs about chairs do not track the existence of chairs);668
• thus, there is no explanatory connection between common beliefs about chairs669
and the existence of chairs;670
• if so, then we should not believe that there are chairs;671
• therefore: we should not believe that there are chairs.672
In e ect, epistemic compatibilism (assuming that eliminativism is our BPT)673
seems to be committed to very similar views. An epistemic compatibilist would,674
in fact, subscribe to the following theses:675
• there is an explanation of the common beliefs that there are chairs (and676
eventually an explanation of their origin);677
• this explanation does not depend on the existence of chairs;678
• there is no explanatory connection between the existence of chairs and ex-679
istential beliefs about chairs. Chairs do not exist, so chairs cannot explain680
anything.681
However, debunking arguments are typically anti-compatibilist arguments, be-682
cause to debank a recalcitrant belief that „ is, typically, to conclude that we should683
abandon such a belief. So, if one is a debunker with respect to „, one is surely not684
willing to reconcile „ with BPT. On the contrary, the epistemic compatibilist is685
a compatibilist and compatibilism’s most relevant aim, as we have seen, is to pre-686
serve the status of common beliefs. From the claim that the origin about our beliefs687
about chairs is not related to the existence of chairs, the epistemic compatibilist,688
unlike the debunker, does not conclude that the source of such common beliefs is689
disreputable and, thus, that having beliefs about chairs is somewhat “irrational”.690
On the contrary, the epistemic compatibilist claims that, given that beliefs about691
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middle-sized artifacts are common, they need to be explained in a way which is692
compatible with our BPT, namely eliminativism.693
The aim of a compatibilist (be it semantic, cognitive or epistemic) is to be694
be conservative with respect to common beliefs, even in the face of our preferred695
revisionary metaphysical theory. The result of a debunking argument is instead696
revolutionary: some common beliefs (the common belief that there are chairs)697
have to go, and we need to heavily reconceptualize our or others mental life to do698
without them (“no more beliefs about chairs!” says the eliminativist debunker).699
The result of epistemic reconciliation is not “revolutionary”; the status of our700
common beliefs qua common beliefs is preserved, and it is preserved just because701
we have found a good explanation for the tendency to have such beliefs, which is702
compatible with our philosophical preferences. But then, according to the epistemic703
compatibilist, there is no need to reconceptualize our mental life, no need for a704
massive clean-up of our deteriorated beliefs.705
Finally, the debunker and the epistemic compatibilist are modally orthogonal:706
the aim of the debunker is to explain what should be believed; the aim of the epis-707
temic compatibilist is to explain what is actually believed; for the debunker what708
others actually believe should simply be dismissed; for the epistemic compatibilist,709
it can be saved if it can be explained in accordance with our BPTs.710
5 Conclusions711
In this paper, we have presented a new strategy of reconciliation between com-712
mon beliefs and BPTs: epistemic compatibilism. We have claimed that such a713
strategy of reconciliation should be preferred to semantic and cognitive flavours714
of compatibilism as far as each of these strategies is based on a peculiar form of715
“recarving”. We have claimed that reliance on recarving (semantic or cognitive) is716
at the origin of a potential sceptical attitude that, ironically enough, was the main717
motivation for choosing a compatibilist stance in the first place. Semantic and718
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cognitive compatibilism are, therefore, self-defeating forms of compatibilism, and,719
if one wants to preserve a compatibilist attitude at all, epistemic compatibilism720
should be preferred.721
Epistemic compatibilism does not have such sceptical consequences because it722
is not based on any form of recarving. According to the epistemic compatibilist, a723
recalcitrant belief that „ has the content it apparently has and it is the mental state724
it apparently is. Rather, to have an epistemic reconciliation between recalcitrant725
beliefs and BPTs, an explanation of why someone has such a belief compatible726
with our BPT is required.727
In case we have an epistemic reconciliation between a recalcitrant belief „ and728
our BPT, „ is still recalcitrant and thus false. But then, common existential729
beliefs about artifacts are false, and this might appear as another manifestation of730
a sceptical threat. We have defended the claim that this is not the case: after an731
epistemic reconciliation, we conclude that recalcitrant beliefs are false, but this is732
not done in isolation. We now have also an explanation of why there is a tendency733
to have these kind of beliefs, and this, we have argued, is enough to save epistemic734
compatibilism from the threat of scepticism.735
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